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*
*

*
*

Argument Priority
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*

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdictional authority to hear this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 78-2a-3(2)(h); and Rule 3(a)
of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
NATURE OF PROCEEDING
Appellant, Raychelle Merriam ("Raychelle"), is appealing a
portion of the Sixth District Court's split custody award in
which Respondent, Todd Merriam ("Todd"), was awarded permanent
custody of the parties minor child, Drew Merriam ("Drew").
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by awarding

custody based upon Appellant's unsubstantiated "extramarital
affairs"?
II. Did the trial court err by basing its custody award upon
evidence not properly before the court?
1

III.

Did the trial court err, when awarding child custody,

by not considering that Appellant was the primary caretaker of
her two boys during the pendency of the action?
IV.

Did the trial court err in splitting custody by not

giving considerable weight to the boys' continued, close
relationship?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATE STATUTES
United States Constitution, Amendment V;
Constitution of Utah, Article I, §12;
Utah Code Ann., §30-3-10(1);
Utah Code Ann., §78-2a-3 (2)(h);
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rule 3(a);
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a); and
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rules 702 and 706.
(See Addendum for text of the above citations).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

This appeal challenges the split child order by the
Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Sixth District Judge, after a trial on
August 2, 1989, in Manti, Sanpete County, State of Utah.
B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.

This matter started July 1988 as two separate divorce
actions in the Sixth District Court, Sanpete County, State of
Utah ("the trial court"). (R. 12, 16, 103, and 112)

2

During an

August 10, 1988, hearing, the two actions were consolidated into
one case:

Civil No. 9444. (R. 24, 27, and 115)

At this same hearing, the parties entered into a stipulation
whereby Raychelle retained custody of the parties' minor son,
Drew Merriam, born June 3, 1986, and Todd received reasonable
visitation of Drew.

(R. 2, 24, 27-28, 104, and 115)

Raychelle

already had permanent custody her other child from a previous
marriage, Carson Draper. (T. 14-16; see also Plaintiff's Exhibit
No. 1)

The trial court approved the parties' stipulation and

later entered a written Temporary Order incorporating the terms
of that stipulation. (R. 25-28, 166)
On October 27, 1989, the trial court entered an Order
appointing the Division of Family Services, Utah State Department
of Social Services, to conduct a child custody evaluation. (R.
37-38) After the "Child Custody Evaluation" was submitted to the
trial court, a trial was set for and held on August 2, 1989,
where the trial court split custody of Drew and Carson. (T. 1,
102-103)
Raychelle, timely and properly, filed an appeal with this
Court contesting the trial court's split custody award of her two
sons. (R. 78, 89, and 98; T. 1)
C.

TRIAL COURT'S DISPOSITION OF THE CASE.

At the Merriam trial, the court ordered permanent custody of
Carson to remain with Raychelle and awarded Todd permanent
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custody of Drew; (T. 102-103)

Furthermore, each party was

granted reasonable visitation rights of the minor child not in
his or her custody, to be exercised so the boys would remain
together during visits, (T. 103, 106-107)
D.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS.

The parties were married November 22, 1985. (T. 14-15)
Drew, born June 3, 1986, was the parties' only child from their
marriage. (T. 14-15)

Raychelle's only other child, Carson, born

December 18, 1983, (of whom she already had permanent custody)
was from a previous marriage. (T. 14-16; see also Plaintiff's
Exhibit No. 1)
When the parties separated during the first part of April
1988, Carson and Drew continued to reside with Raychelle.
15)

(T.

Later, because of a stipulation entered into by the parties,

the trial court awarded Raychelle temporary custody of Drew. (T.
17)
At trial Raychelle testified that she had not had
extramarital sexual intercourse. (T. 29) Moreover, Raychelle
testified that she had never even dated anyone, besides Todd,
while the two were still living together. (T. 29)
During cross examination, Todd testified that the only
behavior he had seen Raychelle engaged in with another man was
talking to him.

(T. 65-70)
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Except for visitation, Carson and Drew lived with Raychelle
from the time the parties separated.

Prior to the separation,

Todd took care of the children for a short time while Raychelle
worked, but Raychelle otherwise had the primary responsibility of
taking care of both boys from the time of their birth.
18)

Raychelle's care of her boys included:

(T. 16-

changing diapers,

giving baths, helping to dress them, shopping for food, preparing
meals, feeding her boys, reading stories, playing with her boys,
and taking care of her boys when they were sick. (T. 18-19)
Carson and Drew had a good relationship and were friends.
(T. 20, 27, and 36) They were together continuously from Drew's
birth until August 2, 1989, when Todd was awarded permanent
custody of Drew and Raychelle retained permanent custody of
Carson. (T. 1, 102-103)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
In making its split custody decision, the trial court relied
heavily on its erroneous finding that Raychelle had "extramarital
affairs".

The Court's findings were based upon inferences it

drew when one witness "took the Fifth Amendment."

There was

nothing presented at trial to properly support such a finding.
Further, even if the finding could be supported there was
absolutely no showing whatsoever of any harm to the children.
The trial court also erred in splitting custody by relying
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on a "Child Custody Evaluation" and expert testimony never
formally admitted into evidence.
Despite clear evidence showing that Raychelle was the
primairy caretaker of her two boys during the pendency of the
action, the trial court improperly ignored this important factor
in awarding child custody.
Finally, by not considering the strong bonding between
Carson and Drew, the trial court erroneously split custody of
Drew and Carson.

Furthermore, nothing was presented at trial to

dictate a split custody award.
ARGUMENTS
Standard of Review
This Court has delineated a review standard for findings of
fact in appeals of permanent child custody awards:
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) states that findings of fact
"shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."
We are bound to follow that rule together with the
guidance of the Utah Supreme Court in the recent case
of Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987), in
which the Court reviewed the case law concerning
findings of fact. There the Court stated: "Failure of
the trial court to make findings on all material issues
is reversible error unless the facts in the record are
'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only
a finding in favor of the judgment,'" and the findings
"'should be sufficiently detailed and include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached'"
(citations omitted). Particularly important is the
Court's citation of Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426
(Utah 1986), a child custody matter, in which it
declared "[p]roper findings of fact ensure that the
ultimate custody award follows logically from, and is
6

supported by, the evidence and the controlling legal
principles. •• We understand this to mean that a custody
award must be firmly anchored on findings of fact that
(1) are sufficiently detailed, (2) include enough facts
to disclose the process through which the ultimate
conclusion is reached, (3) indicate the process is
logical and properly supported, and (4) are not clearly
erroneous. [See also citations are omitted.] If this
is not accomplished by the trial court, the issue of
custody must be reversed unless the record itself
supports the award to the standard reiterated in Acton.
Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 202-203 (Utah App. 1987)
(Emphasis added.)
To successfully contest trial court findings, evidence in
support of the findings must first be marshalled.

Then, a

demonstration must be made that the trial court's findings of
fact are clearly erroneous because they run against the clear
weight of the evidence. See Riche v. Riche, 123 Utah Adv. Rep 31,
32 (Utah App. 1989).

On the other hand, "conclusions of law [are

given] no particular deference, but [are reviewed] for
correctness." Scharf v. BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d 1068, 1070
(Utah 1985).
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY AWARDING CUSTODY
BASED UPON APPELLANT'S UNSUBSTANTIATED "EXTRAMARITAL AFFAIRS"
A. Moral character is only one of many factors a trial
court should consider in awarding child custody.
Although a trial court should examine each party's
demonstrated moral standards in making its custody award, moral
character is only one of many factors the court should properly
consider in determining a child's best interests. Utah Code Ann.
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S 30-3-10(1);
see also

Sanderson v. Tryon, 739 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1987);

Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982).

B. The trial court's finding that Respondent's moral
character was superior to that of Appellant was not supported by
the evidence.
The trial court found that Todd's demonstrated morals were
better than Raychelle's. (T. 105)
explaining:

It went a step further in

"[T]his marriage was disrupted because of the

conduct of [Raychelle] and her affairs with men outside of
marriage. . . ." (T. 102)

In fact, the trial court accused

Raychelle of not being honest regarding "her conduct with men
outside of marriage," because of "the circumstances of her
conduct with men outside the marriage." (T. 106)
Todd expressed his opinion that it was Raychelle's
"stepping out" that initiated their marital problems and
eventually led them to seek divorces from each other. (See T. 5860)

Todd asserted that Raychelle admitted "having sexual

intercourse with other men." (T. 59)

Todd identified one partner

as Russell Meacham, who later testified at the trial. (See T. 59,
80-84)

The other man was said to be John "Macey" from Payson,

although Todd was unsure of Mr. Macey's last name. (T. 59)
When asked on cross examination:

"Did you actually ever see

[Raychelle] with other men, or did you actually see them doing
anything inappropriately with her?" Todd admitted that he had
only seen Raychelle talking with Mr. Meacham. (T. 69-70)
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When Todd's attorney asked Mr. Meacham whether he had had any
sexual intercourse with Raychelle, Mr. Meacham replied:

"I'll

plead the Fifth [Amendment] on that one." (T. 80-81)
Further questioning of Mr. Meacham by Todd's attorney
revealed that Mr. Meacham had first met Raychelle at one of his
delivery stops:

Charley's Drive-in ("Charley's"), in Manti,

where Raychelle was working at the time. (T. 81, 82)

On cross

examination, Mr. Meacham explained that he stopped at Charley's
once a week to make a delivery and to eat dinner. (T. 83) While
at Charley's, Mr. Meacham talked to Raychelle, something he would
do with hired help at other drive-ins, because it was part of his
job. (T. 83)
Other than at Charley's, Mr. Meacham had said "hello" to
Raychelle a couple of times on the street in Sanpete County,
something Mr. Meacham had also done with Todd. (T. 82)
Once, Mr. Meacham did see and visit with Raychelle, outside
of Sanpete County, in Richfield. (T. 81-82)

Mr. Meacham,

however, did not know why Raychelle was in Richfield, nor did
Raychelle stay with Mr. Meacham. (T. 81-82)

Todd also called

Heidi Johnson ("Mrs. Johnson")—a personal friend of Todd's and a
co-worker with Raychelle at Charley's—as a witness to try
establishing that Raychelle had an extramarital affair. (See T.
93-94, 96)

On cross-examination, however, Mrs. Johnson admitted
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that the only type of behavior in which she had ever seen Mr.
Meacham and Raychelle engage was conversation. (T. 96)
During direct examination Raychelle testified that she had
never "had sexual intercourse with anyone, besides Todd, while
[she had] been married to him." (T. 29)

In fact, Raychelle even

denied ever having "dated anyone while [she] and Todd were still
living together." (T. 29)
On the other hand, Raychelle introduced testimony that
before Todd and Raychelle had separated, Todd had "stepped out"
on Raychelle. (T. 50-51; see also

T. 30-32)

C. The trial court improperly relied upon Respondent's
witness invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination in determining that Appellant had extramarital
sexual intercourse.
During closing arguments, Todd's counsel cited Gerard v.
Young, 432 P.2d 343 (Utah 1967), to support his contention that
Raychelle had sexual intercourse with Mr. Meacham.

Gerard was a

"[c]ivil action for termination of a cafe lease" in which
gambling was the only issue:
Defendant denied the allegation,—not under oath.
Thereafter in a deposition, under oath, he took the
Fifth Amendment, admitting that the alleged gambling
might incriminate him, which was inconsistent with the
denial in his pleadings. This left the sworn
affidavits pointing to gambling, which affidavits
further he refused to deny categorically.
432 P. 2d 343 (Utah 1967).
Gerard was clarified in First Federal Savings and Loan
Association v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257, 1268 (Utah 1984):
10

Gerard v. Young, 20 Utah 2d 30, 432 P.2d 343 (1967),
stands for the narrow proposition that where, on a
motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff establishes
through independent, uncontroverted evidence that he is
entitled to summary judgment, a defendant cannot avoid
a summary judgment by claiming the privilege against
self-incrimination.
First Federal Savings and Loan Association also reveals:
To sustain an assertion of the privilege against
self-incrimination, a party must show that the
responses sought to be compelled might be
incriminating. This requires more than merely
declaring that an answer will incriminate—it requires,
"at a minimum, a good faith effort to provide the trial
judge with sufficient information from which he can
make an intelligent evaluation of the claim." Davis v.
Fendler, supra, 650 F.2d at 1160. "The claimant is not
the final arbiter of the validity of his assertion."
Id.
684 P.2d 1257, 1266-1267 (Utah 1984).
Neither Gerard, nor First Federal Savings and Loan
Association. are applicable to the case on appeal because no
uncontroverted evidence, independent from Mr. Meacham invoking
his Fifth Amendment privilege was produced linking Raychelle to
having sexual intercourse with Mr. Meacham.

Furthermore, no good

faith effort was made to provide the trial court with sufficient
information from which it could make an intelligent evaluation of
the claim that Mr. Meacham's testimony would be selfincriminating. (See T. 80-82)
By relying on Mr. Meacham invoking his Fifth Amendment
privilege, without any independent, uncontroverted evidence to
support the claim asserted, the trial court flagrantly abused its
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discretion by finding Raychelle's interaction with Mr. Meacham
was immoral.

In essence, the trial court made its finding

without any supporting evidence.

Rather, the trial court relied

on Todd's testimony that Raychelle was having an affair even
though Todd admitted that the only thing he had ever seen was
Raychelle talking to one other man.
D. Even if Appellant had an extramarital sexual
relationship, there was no evidence showing such behavior was
detrimental to the children.
Even if Raychelle had engaged in an extramarital sexual
relationship, a "custodial parent's extramarital sexual
relationship alone is insufficient to justify a change in
custody." Fontenot v. Fontenot, 714 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1986).
There must be a showing that the children have been "directly
exposed to or affected" by the sexual behavior. Id. at 1132.
No evidence or testimony showing any harm to the children
whatsoever was admitted at trial.
E. The trial court's custody award was based upon the
outmoded concept of fault and was aimed at punishing Appellant.
By awarding Todd a divorce from Raychelle because of her
unsubstantiated extramarital relationships, the trial court
punished Raychelle as it did the wife in Marchant v. Marchant,
743 P.2d 199, 203 (Utah App. 1987); see also
P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988).
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Davis v. Davis, 749

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY BASING ITS CUSTODY AWARD UPON
EVIDENCE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT
A. The court-ordered child custody evaluation was never
formally received into evidence, nor was the child custody
evaluator called as a witness at trial.
On October 27, 1989, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Evidence,
Rule 706, the trial court ordered the Division of Family
Services, Utah State Department of Social Services, to conduct a
child custody evaluation. (See R. 37-38)

On or about June 12,

1989, Mr. Bagley (a licensed social worker assigned by the Utah
State Department of Social Services to conduct the Merriam child
custody evaluation) submitted a report, entitled "Child Custody
Evaluation," to the trial court and each party's attorney. Mr.
Bagley's "Child Custody Evaluation" was never formally offered,
nor received, into evidence. (T. 1 and 15-16; Plaintiff's Exhibit
No. 1)

Furthermore, at trial Mr. Bagley was not called as a

witness. (T. 2-3)
The trial court specifically relied on information from the
child custody evaluator as evidence in making its findings.

See

104)
Rule 706 (a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows courts to
appoint experts and mandates that court-appointed experts:
. . .shall advise the parties of his findings, if any;
his deposition may be taken by any party; and he may be
called to testify by the court or any party. He shall
be subject to cross-examination by each party,
including a party calling him as a witness.
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Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 permits an expert witness
to testify at trial providing that "expert witness" is "qualified
as an expert" and the expert's "scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. . . . "
Once a court-appointed witness is called as a witness and
qualified as an expert, that expert "may testify. . .in the form
of an opinion or otherwise," Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702;
and "shall be subject to cross-examination by each party. . . . "
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 706.
The Court improperly relied upon the Child Custody
Evaluation where it was never submitted or accepted into evidence
and where Mr. Bagley was never called as a witness, qualified as
an expert, nor subject to cross examination at trial.
B. Even if expert testimony had been properly before the
court, as a matter of law, the trial court should have awarded
both boys to Appellant.
Even if Mr. Bagley's report was properly relied upon, Mr.
Bagley's recommendation—and the trial court's subsequent award
of split custody—were grossly wrong because, as stated in his
report, Mr. Bagley's recommendation was made for reasons "more
judgmental than pure fact

" (P. 7) Mr. Bagley admitted:

"there is very little to base an objective judgment on in this
case." (P. 6) Moreover, Mr. Bagley found that Raychelle, the
custodial parent of both Drew and Carson, had provided her boys
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with a "stable home life" and had "demonstrated adequate parentchild skills" (P. 6)
This Court has stated:
Where the call is a close one, we believe the child's
interests will be best promoted by maintaining the
prior, stable and healthy arrangement. That is, where
the evidence was otherwise inconclusive. . .the
paramount consideration of stability conclusively tips
the scale in [the custodial parent's] favor and
warrants awarding custody to [that parent], as a matter
of law.
Paryzek v. Parvzek, 776 P.2d 78, 83-84 (Utah App. 1989).
As a matter of law, the trial court should have awarded
permanent custody of both Carson and Drew to Raychelle.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, WHEN AWARDING CHILD CUSTODY, BY NOT
CONSIDERING THAT APPELLANT WAS THE PRIMARY CARETAKER OF HER TWO
BOYS DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE DIVORCE
In Pusev v. Pusev, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1986), the Utah
Supreme Court held that a court should consider the identity of
the parent with whom the child has spent most of his or her time
pending custody determination if the period is lengthy.
Raychelle had custody of her child from the time of separation in
April, 1988, until August, 1989, a period of sixteen months.
This period is lengthy.

Considering that Drew was only three at

the time, sixteen months was almost one-half of the child's life.
Yet no consideration whatsoever was given to Raychelle having
Drew during this time period nor the stability developed.
At trial the court found that "neither party is the primary
caretaker, that they both care for the children to the best of
15

their ability when they've been in their care." (T. 104)

In

making this determination, the trial court confused "primary
caretaker" with ability to care for the child.

Raychelle was the

primary caretaker during the lengthy pendency of the action and
the Court should have carefully considered the stability created
under that arrangement.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SPLITTING CUSTODY BY NOT GIVING
CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT TO THE BOYS' CONTINUED, CLOSE RELATIONSHIP
A. Child custody awards should keep children together,
unless circumstances dictate otherwise.
In Pusev v. Pusev, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1986), the Utah
Supreme Court also recognized that child custody awards which
keep children together are preferable, except when circumstances
dictate otherwise.
The trial court did recognize that splitting custody of Drew
and Carson was a serious remedy, but stated that under the terms
and under the evidence heard during the trial, it made its
decision on what was in the best in the best interest of Drew.
(T. 103)

The trial court, however, never specifically explained

why split custody would be in Drew's best interest.
Consequently, it is necessary to examine the evidence presented
at trial.
B. The evidence clearly showed Appellant's sons should
remain together with Appellant.
When examined by the trial court as to whether split custody
would have an impact on Carson and Drew, Todd stated:
16

I don't think it's gonna tear them up at all. They've
been separated for the last year, almost every weekend
that I've had them. They're close, but they're going
to be better off with me than they are [Raychelle]."
(T. 78-79)
Todd, quite clearly, did recognize that Carson and Drew have
a close relationship, but the rest of Todd's response to the
trial court's inquiry is confusing.

Todd expressed his opinion

that splitting custody would not have an adverse effect on Carson
and Drew, because "[t]hey've been separated for the last year,
almost every weekend that I've had them. (T. 79) At a later
point in the trial, however, Todd's mother, Joy Merriam,
confirmed that Carson and Drew were together during Todd's
weekend visitation. (T. 84, 86, and 88)
On direct examination, Raychelle testified that Carson and
Drew got along together well and were friends.

She also stated

that splitting up Carson and Drew "would tear them both apart."
(T. 27)

Until August 2, 1989, when the trial court split custody

of Carson and Drew, these two boys had, for the most part, never
been separated since Drew's birth over three years ago. (T. 1417)
The trial court erred in making its custody award because
their was no evidence to dictate splitting custody of Carson and
Drew.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, this Court should vacate
the Sixth District Court's permanent custody award of Drew
Merriam to Respondent, Todd Merriam, and should enter an order
granting Appellant, Raychelle Merriam, permanent custody of both
her sons, Carson Draper and Drew Miriam.
Respectfully submitted this 2 7

day of December, 1989.

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
By Brent H. Bartholomew
Waine Riches
Attorneys for Appellant,
Raychelle Merriam
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ADDENDUM
United States Constitution, amend V
Utah Constitution, art. I, § 12
Utah Code Ann., § 30-10(1)
Utah Code Ann., § 78-2a-3(2)(h)
Rules of Utah Court of Appeals, Rule 3(a)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a)
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 706
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AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES
AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning —
Due process of law and just compensation
clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising J
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb: nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
1896

Art. I,

30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or divorce — Custody consideration.
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children
are separated, or their marriage is declared void or
dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future
care and custody of the minor children as it considers
appropriate. In determining custody, the court shall
consider the best interests of the child and the past
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of
the parties. The court may inquire of the children and
take into consideration the children's desires regarding the future custody, but the expressed desires are
not controlling and the court may determine the children's custody otherwise.
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider,
among other factors the court finds relevant, which
parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the
child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the
court finds appropriate.
1988

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of
adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except
those from the small claims department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court o(
record in criminal cases, except those involving*
charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(0 appeals from district court in criminal
cases, except those involving a conviction of a
first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for &'
traordinary writs involving a criminal con^f
tion, except those involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court m\ul\m<: domestic relations cases, including but not limited
to divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals
from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only
'and by the vote of four judges of the court, may certify
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review
and determination any matter over which the Court
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings.
1988

RULES OF THE UTAH COURT OF
APPEALS
TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS
AND ORDERS.
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: How taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. As defined and provided by law, an appeal
may be taken from the final orders and judgments of
a district court, juvenile court, or circuit court to the
Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal with the
clerk of the particular court from which the appeal is
taken within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of
an appellant to take any step other than the timely
filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity
of the appeal, but is a ground only for such action as
the Court of Appeals deems appropriate, which may
include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions
short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney
fees.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall
find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that
the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the tindings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings
on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement
of the ground for its decision on all motions granted
under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the
motion is based on more than one ground.

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
Rule 702. Testimony by experts.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.

Rule 706

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule : 706. Court-appointed experts.
-, (a)^ Appointment The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party enter an order to
show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert witnesses
agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint expert
witnesses of its own selection. An expert witness
shall not be appointed by the court unless he consents
to act. A witness so appointed shall be informed of his
duties by the court in writing, a copy of which shall
be filed with the clerk, or at a conference in which the
parties shall have opportunity to participate. A witness so appointed shall advise the parties of his findings, if any; his deposition may be taken by any
party; and he may be called to testify by the court or
any party. He shall be subject to cross-examination
by each party, including a party calling him as a witness.
(b) Compensation. Expert witnesses so appointed
are entitled to reasonable compensation in whatever
sum the court may allow. The compensation thus
fixed is payable from funds which may be provided by
law in criminal cases and civil actions and proceedings involving just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment. In other civil actions and proceedings
the compensation shall be paid by the parties in such
proportion and at such time as the court directs, and
thereafter charged in like manner as other costs.
(c) Disclosure of appointment. In the exercise of
its discretion, the court may authorize disclosure to
the jury of the fact that the court appointed the expert witness.
(d) Parties' experts of own selection. Nothing in
this rule limits the parties in calling expert witnesses
of their own selection.

